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21. Introduction
This paper analyzes the migration control industry in Spain. The case study explores the appearance 
and evolution of the emerging organizational framework to control migration flows that has 
developed around border management and is limited to actors involved in this sphere (control 
providers); not included are actors and formal and informal organizations involved in facilitating 
irregular migration. 
There are two reasons for focusing specifically on this little explored area of the migration industry 
and applying it to the Spanish case: first, the importance that migration control has acquired in 
this southern European country over the recent past; and, second, the relevance of the Spanish 
experience in the current European context, marked by the refugee crisis and the reactive European 
policy on migration control that it has provoked. 
Restrictions on the freedom of movement have generated growing business opportunities, 
increasing transaction costs and the appearance of intermediaries (some to facilitate, others to 
restrict movement) who modulate the dynamics and management of the flows. The dynamics of 
this migration market, in which a growing number of non-state actors participate, tend toward 
increasing capitalization of both functions (impeding or facilitating), which reflects the interrelations 
in the appearance of business opportunities in the race between permeability (which has been 
examined in greater detail by studies on the migration industry) and impermeability. Studying 
migration control from this perspective allows us to transcend and complement traditional state-
centric/migrant-centric approaches in this sphere of migration policy by incorporating non-state 
actors and also sets the groundwork for a detailed description of how migration control markets 
in different national settings are shaped. 
This paper is structured in two parts. The first reviews the concept of the migration industry, 
including an introduction to the notion of migration control markets, and presents a systematic 
inventory of the functions, actors and outsourcing formulas that operate within these markets. 
The second part focuses on analyzing the Spanish case. This section presents and describes the 
outsourcing initiatives and practices that have been developed by the Spanish government to 
control irregular immigration at the borders and within its territory, highlighting the differences 
with other international cases that have been studied previously. 
Our hypothesis is that the outsourcing practices implemented by the Spanish case cannot be 
exclusively explained by the level of neoliberalization or the “varieties of neoliberalism” of the 
state (Menz, 2009 2011; 2013), but rather that they are also the result of the priorities in migration 
policy and, in particular, of the factors that influence how migration control is implemented. These 
factors are shaped by the fact that Spain is a border state and the distinctive ways it has managed 
migration over the past three decades. 
32. Migration Industry and Migration Markets
2.1 On the migration industry
The migration industry focus has gained some prominence in migration studies over the past 
few years. Its development as an analytical approach is based on the belief that the dynamics 
of international migration management cannot be entirely understood without considering its 
economic aspects, as well as the processes of commercialization and financial gain, and the private 
interests that materialize around them. 
Despite its current popularity, there are many antecedents to this approach in academic literature, 
although they have not always adopted the same term. For example, at the end of the 1970s, 
Harney introduced a concept he referred to as “the commerce of migration” to describe profitable 
activities carried out by a broad range of intermediaries (mainly labor, transportation and money 
brokers) who intervened in the facilitation and maintenance of Italian migration to the American 
continent between the end of the 19th Century and the start of the 20th (Harney, 1977). This 
initial mention was completed in the following two decades by other contributions (employing 
the concept of “migration business”) focused on trafficking and smuggling of migrants (Salt and 
Stein, 1997; Kyle and Koslowski, 2001). Castles and Miller mentioned the concept of migration 
industry in The Age of Migration, linking it to the migration systems theory (Castles and Miller, 
2003). However, the term has become much more prevalent in the academic lexicon over the 
past decade through Hernández-León’s examination of migration between Mexico and the United 
States, in which he defined in much greater detail the migration industry “as the ensemble of 
entrepreneurs, businesses and services which, motivated by the pursuit of financial gain, facilitate 
and sustain international migration” (Hernández-León, 2005, 2; see also Hernández-León 2008). 
His definition includes the different legal, illegal, formal and informal activities structuring the 
migration process and that are linked to various actors (state actors, migrants, migrant advocacy 
groups) (Hernández-León, 2005). These contributions, which have shaped a growing literature 
centered on analyzing the services provided by a broad range of intermediaries, including, 
smugglers, recruiters, brokers and companies1, have various elements in common. First of all, this 
literature considers the migration industry to be a meso-structure that links macro- and micro- 
level structures in the migration process (Spener, 2010). Second, these contributions have focused 
on what we can refer to as services associated with the facilitation of migration (facilitation services 
providers), incorporating additional explanatory elements in the structure and maintenance of 
the migration process between areas of origin and destination. Finally, these approaches have 
based their analyses on the participation of intermediate actors who are motivated by the pursuit 
of financial gain. 
Over the past few years this approach has been the focus of new conceptual and analytical revisions 
that have broadened its scope through a more comprehensive examination of the many “migration 
markets” and emphasizing other functions. For example, Nyberg Sorensen and Gammeltoft-
1. Th e analysis of intermediary services channeling migrant worker fl ows has been somewhat developed in migra-
tion studies through historical contributions (Gabaccia, 2000) and more recent work analyzing the importance of 
private actors in recruiting and supplying workers, although not always framed in the concept of the migration in-
dustry (see for example, Krissman, 2000; Hennebry, 2008).
4Hansen (2013) recently examined the associations between the functions of migration facilitation 
and control. These authors, expanding on the work of Agustín (2008), also introduced the “rescue 
industry” as an aspect of the migration industry, referring to actors who provide “assistance” 
to migrants (Nyberg Sorensen and Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2012). In their words, the migration 
industry could be redefined as “a wide array of non-state actors who provide services that facilitate, 
constrain or assist international migration” (Nyberg Sorensen and Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2013, 
6-7). Similarly, in various recent articles Hernández-León (2013a and 2013b) has broadened the 
analytical horizon of this focus by including other kinds of intermediaries, mainly “facilitators, 
firms engaged in control and restriction, rescue organizations, and clandestine actors” (Hernández 
León, 2013a, 24 and ss.). These revisions have had a large impact on recent academic literature, 
and the focus has spread to studies on migration control and the regulation of legal and labor 
migration (Garapich, 2008; Spaan and Hillman, 2013, Surak, 2013; Andersson, 2014; Groutsis, Di 
van de Broek and Harvey, 2015; Andrijasevic, 2015). 
The recent academic advances in this approach have emphasized two broad elements that 
transversally penetrate the analysis of migration flows. First of all, that this migration industry is a 
crucial aspect of international mobility and, therefore, should become a subject of migration theory 
studies. International migration flows cannot be understood without considering the factors that 
lead to the appearance and consolidation of this industry and the actors it involves. Second, that 
the migration industry is shaping how migration is managed on the national and international 
levels, restructuring the global governance of human mobility (Betts, 2013). 
2.2. From Migration Industry to Markets of International (Irregular) Migration 
However, in our opinion, exploring this approach and evaluating its suitability for certain analytical 
contexts requires some conceptual clarifications. In this section we will revise the term migration 
industry and propose the term “international migration markets”, which, as we shall see, is more 
suitable2 (see Figure 1). It should be emphasized that migration industry literature tends to use 
metaphorically ideas that have specific meanings in the economy. This is the case of terms such 
as “market”, “industry”, “business” or “profit”. Although the main objective of this paper is not 
to reconsider or evaluate the concept of migration industry from the lexical perspective of the 
economy, it is necessary to introduce certain nuances in the terms employed in order to clarify the 
approach and its analytical ramifications in case studies. 
Despite the fact that its denomination as “industry” could be associated with criteria used to 
classify sectors of productive activities in national accounts, the migration industry has little to 
do with manufactured goods. The term “industry” in this approach apparently has been chosen 
due to other connotations of industrial activities, like their organized structure and private profit 
orientation. The metaphoric use of the term “industry”, including all sorts of organized activities, 
is also visible in studies that include supply-demand interactions and do not restrict their analysis 
to the providers of these services. Therefore, in the area of the dynamics and management of 
international mobility, the notion of “markets” is relevant, because the restrictions to free mobility 
2. A similar term (“market for managing migration”) was introduced recently by Gammeltoft-Hansen and Nyberg 
Sorensen (see Gammeltoft-Hansen, T. and Nyberg Sorensen, N: 2012 and 2013). 
5through national and supranational bordering practices increase the transaction costs of border 
crossings and thereby create opportunity structures for systematic and organized provision of 
cross-border relocation services. These international migration markets are not limited to the 
actors providing the relocation services demanded by migrants, because these “facilitators” of 
irregular border crossings create an additional demand for border control measures with states 
providing or subcontracting services related to the implementation of immigration policies.
Although the concept of international migration markets has the advantage of including supply-
demand interactions, its inclusive nature also implies a higher risk of using it simply as a nebulous 
proxy for all organized activities linked to border permeabilization and impermeabilization. 
The distinctive “economic” nature of markets is based on the presence of transactions, and these 
imply the interchange of goods and services between actors through the negotiation of quantities 
and prices. When a state licenses contracts to providers of border control services, or a migrant 
pays for illegal border crossing services, it can be considered a market activity. But payments 
and prices should not be conflated with profits, because not all market activities are profit-
oriented. Additionally, market actors are not necessarily private organizations, sometimes public 
organizations also operate in markets (e.g., universities and research institutes, public security 
providers).
The asymmetrical structure of most markets, far from complying with the conditions of “perfect 
competition”, is fertile ground for market intermediation services. In general terms, intermediation 
in markets develops if intermediaries help match supply with demand through information and 
negotiation; if intermediation allows for simplifying transactional ties; if scale advantages and 
task specialization can be achieved; or if intermediaries provide mechanisms for risk-sharing, 
financing and payment. The pronounced asymmetry between migrants and states implies large 
and diversified opportunities for intermediation (Godenau and López-Sala, 2016a). Migrants 
facing restrictive borders look for the expertise of facilitators and are willing to pay for relocation 
services if they can afford it3. In parallel, states also strive for intermediation as border management 
becomes increasingly complex, requires more specialized services (e.g., technology) and is labor 
intensive in some of its elements (retention centers, visa expedition, etc.).
Figure 1. Markets of international (irregular) migration
Actors (demand) Functions Actors (supply)
Migrants Facilitation Trafficking and smuggling net-
works, intermediation businesses, 
transportation, NGOs, etc.
States and supranational entities 
(e.g., EU)
Restriction Airlines, security and technology 
companies, NGOs, etc.
3. This is why impermeable borders create market segmentation; it is quite different to “buy-yourself-in” using the 
high-price segment (by plane, using fake documents) than it is to use more risky maritime journeys. For obvious 
reasons most studies focus on situations of migrant vulnerability, but a significant share of irregular international 
migration is unobserved as it is very efficient (opaque) and does not raise attention of public debate.
6For analytic purposes it is worth mentioning that there are two neatly separated markets related 
to irregular international migration: the market of border crossing (facilitators) and the market 
of migration control (restrictors). The recent literature about the “migration industry” seems to 
include service providers in both markets, but their market structures are completely different. 
Demand in the border crossing market is highly fragmented (polypoly, migrants are price-takers), 
while the demand in the migration control market is concentrated (monopsony, States with power 
of negotiation). On the supply side, the border crossing market is mostly illegal and informal with 
phenomena of self-organization, but also tending towards increasing “industrial” organization 
and capitalization. The suppliers in the border control market are concentrated (oligopoly) and 
normally linked to the general security industry (providers of military services; technology, 
expertise, etc.). These differential elements explain the majority of the links that are established 
between migrants, states and organizations or more or less formal structures of intermediation, as 
well as the dynamics that are established in each of these areas. 
2.3. The Irregular Migration Control Market
Using these clarifications, we can define the “irregular migration control market (IMCM)” as a 
services market directed at controlling cross-border mobility, in which a broad range of actors 
participate. This supervision and selective immobilization market is embedded in the organizational 
framework of migration control, which includes infrastructure (material resources, such as 
human and technological resources), structural elements (regulation of the process, including 
intervention protocols) and superstructural elements (ideas and ideologies that guide the process). 
The dynamics of this market have two main characteristics: first, higher transaction costs derived 
from the application of restrictive border policies, leading to the rise of intermediation services 
facilitating movement; and, second, increased use of services to contain this mobility, with the 
objective of being more effective and controlling costs. 
This market covers various functions of border control and internal control, including: a) the 
selection, filtering and registration of entries; b) surveillance, detection, interception and rescue; 
c) retention and immobilization; and d) transportation (expulsion) of irregular immigrants. These 
primary functions have activated a market (or framework) of secondary services to assist migrants 
in the situations and infrastructures where businesses and state-financed social organizations 
participate in migration control, the latter forming a market to specifically provide services to 
assist irregular migrants. This web of support services has emerged in many receiving countries 
as a consequence of what we can refer to as migration enforcement accountability, that is, public 
scrutiny of how migration control policy, which is subject to national and international legislation, 
is applied. 
The nature of the services provided and the actors who intervene4 in this market are articulated 
4. Although this paper focuses on private actors who provide this kind of service, we should not forget the practice and 
operation of migration control incorporates public actors who coordinate their action with these private actors creating 
a material, structural and operational web to contain cross-border mobility, in some areas blurring the lines between 
public and private. Despite the use of functional distinction between facilitation and restriction/control services, spe-
cialists have pointed out the difficulties in categorizing or classifying the action of some of the actors, especially because 
the same actor can act as facilitator or restrictor of international cross-border mobility (see Spaan and Hillman, 2013). 
7around these functions (see Figure 2). It is important to point out that, while in the case of facilitation 
services, the demand is generated principally by migrants themselves, who seek a series of services 
directed at overcoming physical and bureaucratic barriers to cross the border, the demand for 
restrictive and enforcement services is concentrated among the states and supranational entities 
with competence in this area (e.g., the European Union). This is why, generally speaking, the 
actors involved in the containment market maintain close ties with states through the process of 
outsourcing (see Figure 1), as pointed out by other authors (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2013). 
Figure 2. Functions and Actors in the Irregular Migration Control Market
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The increasing push toward privatization and outsourcing in the migration control services market 
(Lahav, 2003; 2014; Bloom, 2015; Trujillo-Pagán, 2014) can be explained by the convergence of 
a group of interrelated factors, that we can outline here. First of all, as a consequence of what 
we can refer to as adaptive control challenges. In the European case, for example, the growing 
politicization, visibilization and criminalization of irregular immigration has led to a very 
complex policy, made even more complicated by the creation and management of a common 
area of free movement, in which different levels of government intervene. Despite the fact that the 
state is the main actor in the construction of the rules that regulate cross-border transactions, the 
gradual process of building a common European policy on border material and the movement 
of people has produced the emergence of new organizational challenges stemming from joint 
management (e.g., in visa policy) and coordination (through the implementation of Integrated 
Border Management). This is combined with new demands that require an expertise not found in 
governmental agencies (and that both businesses and social organizations can provide), as well as 
infrastructure that is partially or totally subcontracted (e.g., transportation infrastructure). 
8Secondly, outsourcing is the consequence of what we can denominate budgetary control challenges, 
in reference to factors linked with the cost of services. In a context of budget cuts, the search for less 
expensive services and increased efficiency has led states to reformulate how to finance migration 
control. This situation has turned migration control into a new business opportunity, in which 
the private sector has gained a great deal of influence by offering the specialization and added 
value of their services (expertise and infrastructure), as well as lobbying, in which the creation of 
exportable spin-offs and the suitability of the provision of global services are emphasized. 
Thirdly, it is a consequence of what we can refer to as accountability and legitimacy challenges. 
The highly sensitive nature, from a social and legal perspective, of actions carried out to control 
migration has led to the externalization of migration management through mechanisms that 
permit greater flexibility and freedom of action, while also impeding public scrutiny over such 
interventions and promoting opacity. The indirect externalization of the task of supervising 
procedures and migrant assistance through outsourcing makes it possible to elude accountability 
to the general public and national parliaments; an aspect that to a large degree explains why the 
management of migration control in some “settings” has been outsourced to certain civil society 
entities5.
Therefore, this irregular cross-border migration market has mainly been articulated through two 
types of state strategies: a) to license comprehensive services packages and b) subcontract specific 
services and infrastructures in all of the primary and secondary functions mentioned earlier, 
including all irregular immigration control functions, from processing visas, to selecting, filtering, 
identifying and registering migrants, as well as detaining, assisting and transporting them. 
This new, increasingly privatized, regulatory framework for controlling cross-border movement 
has been widely studied by specialists. The resulting debate has centered on a series of aspects. First 
of all, the path-dependence and lock-in effect of this process, which, once put into action, impedes 
reversing the tendency. This aspect seems especially relevant in the case of security companies that 
intervene in different control scenarios and functions.
The consequences of this process is not only that these actors have gained prominence in making 
decisions and implementing migration control policies, both in terms of functions and resources 
(Lemberg-Pedersen, 2013), but also that expert knowledge no longer comes from within 
government organizations (Bloom, 2015). Privatization, however, is not currently interpreted as 
weakening the state’s control over migration, but rather it is seen as a reformulation of the control 
strategies and techniques exercised and supervised by the government (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 
2013). 
Secondly, this growing privatization of migration control has sparked great concern among experts 
regarding how it affects the rights of refugees and irregular immigrants, and the democratic 
supervision over whether or not those rights are respected at the borders and within the territories 
5. These general determinants, however, are activated differently in the various national cases. For example, Menz 
argued, in a comparative research, that the degree of neoliberalization matters in terms of the involvement of private 
actors in carrying out functions of transportation, detention, prevention and deportation of migrants (Menz, 2009, 
2011 and 2013). His main conclusion is that the rationale for incorporating private actors in migration control is the 
“neoliberal obsession over alleged efficiency gains, the ideological faith in the superiority of private-sector solutions, 
and alleged cost-saving” (Menz, 2013, 114). 
9of countries of destination (Rodenhäuser, 2014; Lahav, 2014; Baird, 2016). As Gammeltoft-Hansen 
(2011) recently described, migration control practices carried out by private actors have proven to 
have “certain responsibility and accountability gaps”, diffusing legal responsibility, causing a lack 
of transparency and impeding public scrutiny. In his own words, migration control “appears to 
operate behind a corporative veil” (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2013). 
Thirdly, the debate has spread to the functions carried out by social organizations, whose inclusion 
in this irregular immigration control market has been linked to the concept of “assistance or rescue 
industry”. The debate around the role of civil society organizations in some of the areas where they 
exercise control has led to analyses on the levels of collaboration, coopting and independence of 
these organizations and their positions regarding state-sponsored initiatives and how they react to 
them (Nyberg Sorensen, 2013).
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3. The market of (irregular) migration control in Spain. Exploring the logic of 
outsourcing
The objective of this section is to analyze and describe this irregular migration control market 
(and the dynamics and practices of outsourcing) in the Spanish case, underscoring how it differs 
from other national cases that have been previously studied. Our hypothesis is that in the Spanish 
case outsourcing practices cannot be exclusively explained by the level of neoliberalization, or 
the “varieties of neoliberalization”6 of the Spanish state (Menz, 2009 2011; 2013), but rather that 
they are also the result of the priorities of migration policy and, in particular, of the factors that 
condition how migration control is implemented, which are shaped both by the fact that Spain is 
a border state (the southern maritime border of the Schengen Area) (Andersson, 2014) and by the 
peculiarities of how it has managed migration over the past three decades. 
This analysis is carried out within the context of the different functions to control human movement 
around which this market and its services are based. The analysis demonstrates how state practices 
and strategies to contain migration now feature greater embeddedness between the government 
and the private sector, revealing how complex and dynamic migration control governance has 
become, although the state has not lost any of its sovereignty, and that this approach is a response 
to different priorities of this policy and to processes related to the accountability and legitimization 
of these practices. We will highlight how the Spanish migration control market operates under 
high levels of formality, with the participation of businesses and other highly specialized private 
actors that have close ties with the Spanish government and European agencies, and where the 
provision of what we have denominated primary and secondary services are highly concentrated 
in a few companies and social organizations. 
What are the differences in the way outsourcing is used in the Spanish migration control market 
and how is this linked to the peculiarities of Spain as an immigration country?
In general terms we can state that in contrast to what is observed in other countries, such as 
certain Anglo-Saxon countries, in the Spanish case outsourcing in areas and services related to 
“security” can be described as expanding selectively and at a low intensity, this is also true in the 
area of migration management. In this sense, the Spanish model is closer to a “continental model”, 
as observed in Germany or the Netherlands, and until recently also in Italy, where, for example, 
the privatization of detention facilities has never been contemplated as an alternative to public 
managed facilities. 
Outsourcing in Spain has been concentrated in the area of border control (hard policies), a basic 
priority of migration policy, through the contracting and buying of services, equipment and 
infrastructure that provides greater control over undesired irregular mobility through maritime 
corridors. This is particularly relevant in the case of technology and infrastructure construction 
companies, which maintain strong ties with the state through their participation in other areas, 
such as defense and public works. Outsourcing involves greater protagonism for private actors in 
6. Menz (2011) introduces the hypothesis that different varieties of neoliberalism can be observed; if they are more 
pronounced they are correlated with greater involvement of private companies in control and enforcement functions 
in the sphere of migration management. 
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decision making, the elaboration of intervention protocols and operational practice in migration 
control, although management in this area remains under the control of the state and agencies 
with competences over migration. Through this collaboration with the private sector, government 
agencies have greatly increased their expertise over the past decade. The rationale for outsourcing 
arises from the need to improve the infrastructure and effectiveness of migration control, as well 
as the demands for specialized support in sectors that are highly dependent on technological 
innovations, in a policy area that is also subject to the requirements of the European Union. 
Outsourcing is more extensive and has more ramifications in the case of assistance provided to 
migrants in geographical and institutional settings where migration is controlled (soft policies), 
creating a services market in which economic interests, legitimization mechanisms and the desire 
to provide protection converge; here the role of non-governmental organizations stands out. 
This system of public management through agreements with social assistance organizations has 
a long tradition in Spanish public policies, particularly in immigration policy (Bruquetas et al,. 
2011), creating a joint management formula to provide assistance that allows the state to contain 
costs on permanent infrastructure and have more flexibility when dealing with what has been 
a volatile phenomenon in the Spanish case. The Spanish management system is also based on a 
model that strongly guarantees rights, but is very weak in terms of resources. 
Outsourcing in the “selection and filtration services” market, specifically in the area of visas, is 
closer to what is observed in other Schengen countries. As is the case in the majority of European 
countries, Spain established an agreement with VFSglobal7, a company that manages the visas for 
50 states around the world, and which carries out this function in 49 Spanish consulates. 
The collaboration between the government and the business sector is especially strong in the 
market for “surveillance, detection and interception” of migrants in transit or at the border. The fact 
that Spain is the southern border of the Schengen Area has shaped its policies to contain irregular 
migration flows and heavily affected the configuration of its human mobility control market in 
terms of investment (material infrastructure) and also by converting it into a place to assay control 
practices and technologies (technical and operational knowledge). The political and media focus 
on flows through maritime and peripheral land corridors8 largely explains why Spain has invested 
so heavily in making their border impermeable using technological mechanisms, such as remote 
detection and physical barriers (Godenau and López-Sala, 2016 b), rather than biometric control, 
which is the priority in European countries that do not have an external border. This process is 
also characterized by a growing European market, in which the Spanish government continues to 
demand services and distribute/adjudicate resources, while being complemented by the demands 
7. See http://www.vfsglobal.com/
8. According to offi  cial data, between 1999 and 2015 more than 200,000 people have attempted to reach Spanish ter-
ritory through these corridors. This number, while large, is extremely small compared to the number of entries that 
have occurred through airport (Latin American citizens) and land borders (Romanian citizens), which have been 
the true motor of Spanish immigration. However, despite its much smaller volume, controlling the maritime border 
and African irregular immigration has been the priority for Spanish policy.
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and resources provided by the European Union9. The use of this kind of technology, understood 
by the Spanish authorities as a “comprehensive solution” to the “problem” of irregular immigration 
through maritime borders, explains why construction and security companies specialized in remote 
detection and satellite surveillance have gained such prominence in this selective immobilization 
market and their increasing protagonism in the creation of migration control not just in Spain 
but all over Europe. The growing prominence of these companies, as they have extended and 
diversified their technological control services, initially began under the rationale of improving 
the efficacy and specialization of the service. The most paradigmatic examples in the Spanish case 
are those of the Spanish companies Amper and Indra10, and more recently TTI11 or GMV12.  
The Spanish government has also used a growing among of resources to making the area around 
the cities of Ceuta and Melilla impermeable using barrier technologies13. 
Between 2005 and 2015 the Spanish government paid over 60 million euros to contracted 
companies to construct, extend and maintain border facilities14. The main beneficiaries of these 
public contracts were large Spanish construction and security companies, including Dragados, 
Ferrovial, Indra, Eulen, Acciona, Initec, Tragsa and Securitas15. In 2014, more than a million euros 
were adjudicated to the Malaga-based company Mora Salazar, which owns the European Security 
Fencing company16 .
This collaboration also extends to the market that we have denominated, perhaps overly 
euphemistically, as immigrant “mobilization and transportation services”, understood as a market 
directed at, using the term coined by Koshravi, the physical “removal” of irregular immigrants 
(Koshravi, 2009). Studies on privatization in the political sphere have frequently referred to the 
9. Regarding how European projects on border security and surveillance financed by the EU in the 7th Framework 
Programme have been concentrated in a small group of technology companies, see Baird, 2016. In his study, Baird 
underlines the importance of the Italian company, Finmeccanica, the French company, Thales, and the Spanish com-
panies Indra and TTI.  
10. Th ese companies created and developed the External Surveillance Integrated System (SIVE), a remote detection 
system of vessels that later inspired a large number of technological and operational initiatives at the European scale. 
This system cost 232 million euros just for the period between 2000-2008. This system was also successfully exported 
to other European countries such as Latvia, Portugal and Romania and non-European countries (Hong Kong). The 
complexity of the links between the public and private facets of the migration control market can be seen in the also 
growing presence of public institutions and companies in this market. The best example is the Spanish public com-
pany ISDEFE, which in recent years has increased its presence in this sector participating in European projects such 
as Closeye (coordinated by the Spanish Civil Guard), Oparus and Perseus.
11. TTI participated in the Talos and Seabila projects. http://www.ttinorte.es/
12. GMV was the main company benefi ted by EUROSUR in 2014.
13. According to data provided by the Ministry of the Interior and presented by the newspaper El País, between 
1999 and 2004 Spain spent at least 140 million euros in the border fences around Ceuta and Melilla (see El País, 21 
October, 2014). 
14. Data from a request of the Ministry of the Interior by journalists through the “Tu Derecho a Saber” (Your Right to 
Know) Platform, a digital platform created in 2012 by various social organizations with the objective of transferring 
requests for information made by citizens (see http://tuderechoasaber.es/es/help/about/index.html). 
15. Indra and Dragados concentrate 50� of the budget of contracts that have been awarded.
16. Th e European Security Fencing Company was created in 2003 within the Salazar business group, and it is the 
only producer of razor wire in Europe. 
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role of airlines in remote control mechanisms (Lahav and Guiraudon, 2000; Scholten, 2015; 
Bloom and Risse, 2014; Rodenhäuser, 2014). Although the study of deportation practices has 
been growing in importance in migration control analysis (Ellerman, 2009; De Genova and 
Peutz, 2010; Hiemstra, 2012; Coutin, 2015; Golash-Boza, 2015), only recently has it dealt with 
the involvement of transportation companies within the deportation complex. Between 2003 and 
2013, Spain expulsed more than 125,000 irregular immigrants17  (Saiz de la Maza, 2015) and the 
annual expenditure on expulsions has been estimated to be 25 million euros18. 
Since 2012 agreements have been reached through public tenders with the airlines Air Europa and 
Swiftair (UTE) (in 2013 and 2015) for 12 million euros a year to provide transportation within 
Spanish territory and abroad, which included strict confidentiality clauses. Although deportations 
on commercial flights reveal how “normal” the practice of deportation is, this kind of deportation, 
compared to those carried out on flights specifically for this purpose, are subject to greater 
accountability, not just by social organizations, but also by the general public –in this case, other 
passengers on the flights. The agreement with these airlines, which in the 2015 tender presented 
more expensive bids than that of AirNostrum, can be considered, therefore, the result of criteria 
that go beyond cutting costs and subcontracting the service. 
The role of civil society organizations deserves a special mention in this review of outsourcing 
practices, due to their prominence in the Spanish case. Non-governmental organizations participate 
in this irregular immigration control market providing secondary services19, but framed in control 
practices, in every setting where these functions and practices are carried out (see Figure 2). Their 
participation includes: a) providing health services on Spanish coasts and the borders of Ceuta and 
Melilla; b) legal assistance to asylum and refugee applicants and irregular immigrants at the border; 
c) social assistance at internment centers, shelters for asylum seekers and refugees and the CETIs 
(temporary detainment centers for immigrants); legal assistance to irregular immigrants within 
Spanish territory; e) translation services; and f) managing reception centers for unaccompanied 
minors, victims of trafficking and immigrants in a situation of  social vulnerability. To this end, 
the Spanish government has established exclusive agreements with “select” organizations (such as 
the Red Cross20, or the Spanish Commission for Refugee Aid and the Spanish Catholic Migration 
17. Th is statistic does not include the number of entry refusals and rejections at the border. According to EUROSTAT 
data in 2014 over two thirds of all refusals to enter the EU were reported by Spain and Poland (see http://ec.europa.
eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Statistics_on_enforcement_of_immigration_legislation).
18. According to government budget data. Some reports by the Spanish press have elevated this number to 50 million 
euros a year (information from El Confidencial on 18 June, 2015, www.elconfidencial.com). 
19. It must be pointed out that these services are not specifi cally directed at controlling irregular immigration, but 
rather that they are assistance provided to migrants in settings where immigration control is exercised. 
20. Since the beginning of the past decade the Spanish government and the Red Cross have had an agreement to 
manage frontline humanitarian and medical assistance directly on the beach through ERIE teams. In addition, the 
Red Cross manages public funds through direct subsidies to a large number of shelters for immigrants in a situation 
of social vulnerability located throughout the country. In 2014 and 2015 new agreements were signed between the 
Red Cross and the Ministry of the Interior for humanitarian and social assistance for immigrants in internment cen-
ters, with financing of more than 1.2 million euros. In September, 2015 a direct subsidy of 13 million euros was also 
approved to improve the reception system for asylum seekers and refugees and to provide health and social services 
in the CETIs run by the Red Cross, ACCEM and CEAR. The goal of this subsidy was to enlarge Spain’s quite limited 
public system to assist international protection seekers (consisting of just 3 government centers in Madrid, Seville 
and Valencia) by using the reception networks of these three organizations (the CARs, refugee assistance centers),
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Commission Association, in the case of asylum seekers) and created a public tenders program in 
which social organizations and immigrant associations can seek financing.  
Despite the advantages this model of public management offers the government in terms of 
flexibility and cost savings on permanent infrastructure, this type of public management, which 
has been defined by government representatives and major social organizations as a “model based 
on the collaboration between the government and NGOs”, has been subject to heavy criticism and 
has created a great deal of tension among NGOs. Specifically, they criticize the heavy dependence 
of large sectors of civil associations on public funds for migration management, which limits the 
accountability of control practices, as occurs in other countries (Gill, Conlon, Tyler and Oeppen, 
2014). In fact, an examination of the Spanish case reveals a broad process of segmentation within 
civil society between organizations that collaborate with the government in these functions and 
who are integrated in a “protection market”, and those who operate using their own resources or 
who focus on other kinds of actions, such as raising awareness or political lobbying, that require 
fewer resources. In this sense, a certain degree of coopting and clientelism can be observed, 
stemming from an operational interdependence that is largely focused on the material interests 
that converge in the action.
15
4. Final remarks 
In barely three decades Spain has undergone a profound change and has now been consolidated as 
a country that receives migration flows. In this context, irregular maritime immigration, consisting 
mostly of Africans using Mediterranean routes, has generated a great deal of political and public 
attention. This paper is focused on the emerging migration industry that has developed in Spain 
around managing irregular maritime migration. The use of the term “migration industry”, and the 
focus referred to by the same name in international literature, should not make us forget that the 
opportunity structures generated by the impermeabilization of international borders can be better 
described as “markets”, in which supply and demand for services that facilitate or control human 
mobility interact. This analysis focuses on interactive processes, such as outsourcing, intermediation 
in migration projects and civil construction of accountability and so-called “humanitarian borders” 
(Walters 2011; López-Sala and Godenau, 2016). The analysis of the irregular migration control 
market transcends the perhaps overly generic tag of the gradual privatization of migration control, 
to delve into the dynamics of outsourcing through the incorporation of new aspects that reveal the 
complexity of the links between actors and the reconfiguration of the logic behind public/private21 
and profit/non-profit, in migration control practices. 
The particularities of the Spanish case in this material can be summarized as a (still) relatively low 
level of outsourcing; with a profile concentrated in border surveillance (building infrastructures 
and providing technologies) and attending to the needs of immigrants once they are intercepted 
at borders (NGOs selected by the government to provide assistance services). In contrast, Spain 
does not use outsourcing to substitute public servants in border control and the management of 
detention centers. Spanish immigration policies have become more restrictive during the economic 
crisis and their implementation has involved combining technological reinforcement of border 
control –thereby increasing the probability of interception – and cooperation with countries of 
origin and transit in northwest Africa –thereby reducing the probability of arrival and increasing 
the odds of removal.
In the face of the growing selective impermeabilization along the border with Africa, over the 
years Spanish civil society has produced a greater number of private initiatives that are critical 
of bordering practices. These initiatives are generating new forms of knowledge and expertise 
regarding the control process, as well producing new protest dynamics that are increasingly 
covered by the media and embraced by Spanish society. The consequence of this civil response is 
that the actions taken at borders and in detention centers, as well as deportation processes, have 
gained greater visibility. This “watch on the watchers” has increased the need for the authorities to 
accept that they are accountable for how they manage the borders and protect the human rights 
of migrants. 
21. Although this paper has focused on analyzing the private actors who participate in the migration control market, 
we should not forget that this market also includes public actors, including government agencies, research centers 
and public companies who have gained more prominence through their growing specialization in these functions. 
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